of Luzon Force Report
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The contents of this page were submitted to the Battling
Bastards of Bataan by Paul Reuter, a Bataan Defender.
On 29 January 1946, Gen. Edward P. King Jr. submitted
his Luzon Force Operations Report, to Washington. Submitted
along with his report were the G-4 report, explaining
the food, supply, and equipment conditions on Bataan,
and the Surgeon of the Luzon Force Report which describes
the physical and medical conditions on Bataan during 6
January 1942 until 9 April 1942.
1.a. General Supply Situation:
Upon my arrival on Bataan and for the period covered by
this report, the Administrative order covering administrative
details was in operation for use of the Luzon Force, which
was then occupying the Reserve Battle Position (Pilar-Bagac
Road). Prior to 20 March 1942, certain supplies had been
found to be critically inadequate. All troops on Bataan
were operating on one-half ration since about 6 January
1942 and further reductions were to follow.
b. Foraging for animals was about exhausted.
c. Gasoline and lubricants for motor vehicles were inadequate
in appropriate grades and gasoline had been placed on
a command control basis. Daily issues of gasoline for
motor vehicles were to be further reduced.
d. The operation of G-4 Section on Bataan for the period
covered by this report, therefore, was more in the nature
of rationing inadequate supplies than that of it's normal
function of securing, storing, issuing, etc., of supplies.
2. Class I Supplies:
As stated above, troops on Bataan were operating on half
rations and had been reduced in combat efficiency on this
account. As subsistence supplies decreased and notice
was received from Corregidor that no additional subsistence
supplies were available to us from other sources, further
reductions were made periodically in order to prolong
the period of defense. In order to increase our inadequate
subsistence supplies, efforts were made with some success
to bring in shiploads of rice and other foodstuffs from
the southern islands of the Philippine Group through the
ever tightening Japanese blockade. The "Legaspi"
made several such trips before it was reported as captured
about 15 March 1942. Also, several rice mills were put
up and operated on Bataan to utilize the palay (unprocessed
rice, still in the husk.) on hand. This palay was exhausted
prior to 20 March. To add to the meat components, there
were 2,500-3,000 carabao (water buffalo) slaughtered on
Bataan between 6 January and 8 April. Toward the latter
part of this period and after forage for animals was exhausted,
the horses of the 26th Cavalry (PS) (about 250) and about
48 pack mules were slaughtered for food on a priority
basis. About 500-600 of the slaughtered carabao were sent
to Corregidor for storage in the cold storage plant, and
later returned to Bataan for issue to troops. Rice being
the chief component of food, all other supplies, which
were inadequate, were rationed to last for the period
that rice could be made to last. About 20 March, it was
seen that supplies could be made to hold out, until 12
April and reports to Headquarters, United States Forces
in the Philippines, were made to this effect. In addition,
to the means mentioned above to increase the rations on
hand, efforts were being made for several days prior to
surrender to salvage a large amount of flour reported
sunk on a ship at Mariveles. The Regular Army units brought
with them into Bataan extra quantities of foodstuff from
Fort McKinley and Fort Stotsenburg. These were taken up
3. Class II supplies:
a. Organization and individual equipment: Many units of
the Philippine Army had reached Bataan with an inadequate
supply of organization and individual equipment. These
troops had not received proper training in property responsibility
and the importance of supplies. Much of their property
was abandoned during their withdrawal to Bataan. Many
of these troops in combat positions had only the scanty
clothing worn by them during withdrawal. A large percentage
of them had neither raincoats, blankets, nor shelter halves
for ordinary comfort. Small arms, including, automatic
weapons, were abandoned by them and now supplies were
called for to make up deficiencies. Salvage detachments
were organized and some clothing and equipment were made
available for reissue by this means. No additional stocks
in any appreciable amounts were available. For status
of other items of organization equipment, see appropriate
heading below. Regular Army units were very well equipped
with Class II supplies.
4. Class III Supplies - Gasoline and
a. As stated above, supplies which were inadequate were
issued on a control basis and in such a way as to last
as long as subsistence supplies could be made to last.
Gasoline issues were accordingly reduced from daily issues
of about 8,000 gallons per day to about 3,000 gallons
per day during this period. This reduced fuel greatly
restricted necessary operation of motor vehicles and heavy
construction (road) machinery. Gasoline was not available
for use in ambulances to evacuate sick personnel from
combat areas during this period. To better this condition,
use was made of surplus aviation high-octane gasoline
to mix with kerosene and low octane gasoline for use in
combat tanks and in motor vehicles.
b. Lubricating oils, both in quantity and appropriate
grades, were inadequate. It was not practical to change
motor oil in vehicles after long use, on account of this
c. On date of surrender, there remained about 11,000 gallons
of motor fuels and very little lubricating oil of usable
5. Class IV Supplies: - Special Equipment.
a. Engineer Supplies: The Engineers were very well equipped
and functioned well in road construction, trail construction,
construction of air-fields, docks, operation of a sawmill,
etc. The most serious shortage in this service was equipment
needed by combat troops for field fortifications. Barbed
wire, sandbags, and entrenching tools were inadequate.
Shortage in heavy machinery and in motor fuels, and oils,
greatly handicapped operations of the Engineers. Building
materials for protection from rainy weather (shelter materials)
were quite inadequate.
b. Ordnance Supplies: Loss of firearms, including automatic
weapons, was high. This caused a shortage of automatic
weapons in some organizations. Adequate supply of mortars
and 50-caliber machine guns had never been available.
6. Class V Supplies: - Ammunition. At date of
surrender, small arms and artillery ammunition for an
additional thirty days was available at prior rate of
a. The Motor Transport Service, as such, was organized
about 21 March 1942, at the time of designation and organization
of the Luzon Force. Prior to this time, Regular Army units
in general were well equipped with transportation, while
Philippine Army units had only improvised and inadequate
means of transportation composed of commandeered commercial
vehicles. After about 21 March, a limited number of vehicles
were assigned to all units which were entitled to them
by basic allowances and the remaining vehicles were organized
into four regiment Motor Transport Service. Companies
A and B, 12th QM Regiment (PS), formed the nucleus of
the 1st Regiment, MTS. The 2ns Regiment was formed from
the Air Corps QM units as a nucleus. One QM Company of
Air Corps was used in the 4th Regiment. All other motor
transports units were made up of commercial vehicles operated
by civilian drivers. These civilian drivers gave satisfactory
service. The Motor Transport Service had a total of about
1,200 vehicles of which about 200 were military vehicles
and the remainder commercial. b. Spare parts for motor
vehicles were adequate for the number of vehicles which
were able to operate on the reduced gasoline allowances.
c. Motor greases were about exhausted during this period.
d. Distilled water for use in motor batteries having been
exhausted prior to 21 March, the Chemical Warfare Service
came to our aid and supplied this water by aid of some
of it's chemicals.
e. In general, although motor transportation was rapidly
deterioration for lack of lubrication of proper kind,
this service was ahead of the motor fuel supply in meeting
f. Many motor vehicles, including, commercial motor busses,
were destroyed, immediately prior to surrender.
8. Destruction of supplies: - In compliance with orders,
supplies, except subsistence and certain motor vehicles,
were destroyed, just prior to surrender.
Roy C. Hilton Colonel, GSC (Inf) Asst. Ch. Of Staff, G-4